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We employ a panel causality approach in order to examine whether ﬁnancial liberal-
ization affects the magnitude of capital ﬂight, which measures unrecorded accumulation
of foreign assets by the private sector. Our data from 21 emerging market economies for
the period between 1980 and 2004 show no signiﬁcant evidence of a causal relationship.
Lagged values of capital ﬂight, however, seem to increase its current level, indicating its
self-reinforcing characteristic. Our results suggest that ﬁnancial liberalization policies per
se may not be helpful in reducing capital ﬂight. As a result, emerging market economies
should seek to prevent capital from ﬂeeing abroad and encourage repatriation of capital
by improving domestic policy environment instead. Keywords: Capital ﬂight, ﬁnancial
liberalization, emerging markets, panel causality. JEL Codes: F32, F39, C23
1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, many developing countries have followed policies toward liberalization of
their capital accounts in order to attract foreign capital inﬂows that can help ﬁnance not only
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investments but also the rising debt stocks. On the other hand, various studies have also shown
that capital ﬂows can actually take place in the opposite direction as the residents move the
already scarce capital to richer countries (Lucas 1990; Alfaro et al. 2008). The process of
unrecorded accumulation of foreign assets by the private sector is referred to as “capital ﬂight”
(CF) which, especially after the debt crisis of the 1980’s, has come to be viewed as one of
the major economic problems in many developing countries. Not surprisingly, a voluminous
literature has emerged on CF as well as its adverse effects on investment, growth, domestic tax
base, and poverty. One of the two main strands of this research has focused on the different
measures and the determinants of CF (World Bank 1985; Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
1986; Lessard and Williamson 1987; Lensink et al. 2002; Schneider 2003), while the other
strand has concentrated on its effects on macroeconomic outcomes such as ﬁnancial markets
(Loungani and Mauro 2000), high external debt (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Demir 2004),
aid ﬂows (Collier et al. 2004), and investment (Yalta forthcoming). So far, little has been
written regarding the causal relationship between CF and ﬁnancial liberalization. Considering
the fact that the problem is still prevalent, and in view of the ﬁnancial liberalization policies
undertaken by most developing countries, whether CF decreases with ﬁnancial liberalization is
an interesting and important question that needs to be addressed empirically.
Understanding the nature of a possible causal nexus between ﬁnancial liberalization and
CF has important policy implications. If there exists a negative causality running from ﬁnan-
cial liberalization to CF, then these policies can be useful to prevent it. However, if ﬁnancial
liberalization does not have any effect or have a positive effect, then such policies may not be
the panacea for reducing CF, pointing out the need for more effective policy measures. The-
oretically, ﬁnancial liberalization can affect CF in two ways. On the one hand, conventional
analysis suggests that CF should be greater in a closed economy due to residents turning to
illegal channels for moving capital abroad. Thus, by freeing up capital ﬂows, ﬁnancial liber-
alization policies are expected to cause a decline in the magnitude of CF (Mody and Murshid
2005). On the other hand, CF can still exist in a liberalized regime because ﬁnancial openness
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may also bring about certain risks such as uncertainties and vulnerabilities to ﬁnancial crises
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). Park (1996) supports this view, and discusses how CF
can be greater under a free capital account. Groombridge (2001) argues that liberalization can
lead to CF if the country does not undertake the necessary reforms before opening up its capital
account. The little empirical evidence on this issue provides mixed results. Using a portfolio
model, Lensink et al. (1998) investigate the relation between ﬁnancial liberalization and CF for
nine African countries for the 1970-1991 period and conclude that CF has decreased with ﬁ-
nancial liberalization policies. Two descriptive studies by Schneider (2003) and Epstein (2005)
calculate CF using different methodologies and ﬁnd that, in many countries, CF has remained
high and even has increased after 1990.
In this study, our objective is to provide the ﬁrst empirical evidence on the ﬁnancial liber-
alization and CF causal relationship by investigating the case of emerging markets. Emerging
markets are ideal candidates for studying this nexus for two reasons. First, due to the histor-
ically high ﬂows of CF, these countries are more susceptible to its negative effects.1 Second,
since the 1990s, these countries have undertaken ﬁnancial liberalization policies and it is in-
teresting to see whether these policies have been useful in reducing the magnitude of CF. In
order to examine the causal relation between ﬁnancial liberalization and CF, we apply Granger
causality tests for panel data using the dynamic panel estimation model of Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Our analysis is based on
data for 21 emerging market economies for the period between 1980 and 2004.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the deﬁnition and
the calculation of CF. Section 3 describes the data sources. Section 4 reviews the methodology
used in the paper and presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
1The existence of high levels of CF in emerging markets is documented in such studies as Schneider (2003),
Epstein (2005), and Yalta (forthcoming).
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2 The Data
To measure CF, we adopt the “residual method” developed by the World Bank (1985).2 This
approach is based on calculating the discrepancy between the sources of capital ﬂows (i.e., net
increases in external debt and the net inﬂows of foreign investment) and the uses of capital
ﬂows (i.e., the current account deﬁcit and additions to foreign reserves). Thus, we compute CF
at time t as
Kt = Dt + FIt + CASt   Rt (1)
where, Dt refers to the total net debt ﬂows after taking into account the effect of changing
currency composition, FIt is the net foreign investment ﬂows (foreign direct investment and
portfolio equity ﬂows), CASt is the current account surplus, and Rt is the change in foreign
reserves. The data on foreign investment ﬂows, current account, and foreign reserves come
from World Development Indicators (2007). The data on total net debt ﬂows are obtained from
Global Development Finance (2007).
As the measure of ﬁnancial liberalization, we employ the Chinn and Ito (2008) index, which
is one of the most commonly used indices in the literature.3 The index is based on four convert-
ibility restrictions reported in the IMF’s Exchange Arrangement and Agreements (AREAER).
These involve restrictions on payments for capital account transactions, restrictions on pay-
ments for current account transactions, surrender or repatriation requirements for export pro-
ceeds, and the existence of multiple exchange rates. The index is calculated based on the ﬁrst
standardized principal component of the four variables above, and it ranges between -2.66 (full
capital controls) to 2.66 (complete liberalization).
Our study covers the period between 1980-2004. Since capital account liberalization efforts
begin in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we start the data at 1980, also taking into consideration
2While there are other measures such as the Dooley method (Dooley 1986) and the hot money method (Cud-
dington 1986), the residual method is the most commonly used approach in the literature.
3The Chinn-Ito index has been employed in recent studies including Kose et al. (2008), Eichengreen et al.
(2009), Arestis and Caner (2009). It is available online at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/
research.html (accessed November 14, 2010).
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the need to use lagged values. The analysis is based on 21 emerging market economies. The
countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, In-
donesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Transition economies are not included due to data
limitations.
Because the relationship between CF and ﬁnancial liberalization can be affected by other
factors, it is desirable to adopt a multivariate approach to avoid an omitted variable bias. The
two additional variables that we consider are the GDP growth rate and the inﬂation rate.4 Be-
cause uncertainties in the domestic economy encourage residents to transfer capital out of the
country, CF is expected to be higher when the growth rate of GDP is low. As a result, we use
GDP growth rate as the ﬁrst control variable. Another important factor affecting CF is the rate
of inﬂation. Several empirical studies have found that high inﬂation encourages CF by making
assets denominated in domestic currency less attractive in comparison to those denominated in
foreign currency (Dooley 1988; Lensink et al. 1998). Consequently, we include the inﬂation
rate as a second control variable. Both of these variables are obtained from World Development
Indicators (2007) as well.
3 The Methodology and Empirical Results
To examine the existence of a possible causal linkage between ﬁnancial liberalization and CF,
we consider a time-stationary VAR model adjusted to a panel data context as in Holtz-Eakin
et al. (1988, 1989). This approach provides consistent and efﬁcient parameter estimates, while
also allowing to avoid misleading causality results due to an incorrect choice of the lag length
(Podrecca and Carmeci 2001). The two speciﬁcations that we consider are









Zit l + i + uit (2)
4Other alternatives such as interest rate, external debt, tax rates, and political factors can also be considered.
We include these two variables due to data limitations and a concern for the degree of freedom.
5Yalta AY, Yalta AT. 2011. Does Financial Liberalization Decrease Capital Flight? A Panel
Causality Analysis. Working paper no: 11-02, Department of Economics, TOBB ETU.










 Zit l + i + vit (3)
Here, i(i = 1;:::;N) refers to individual countries, t(t = 1;:::;T) refers to the time
period, and l shows the lag number. FOit and CFit respectively denote ﬁnancial liberalization,
and capital ﬂight as a percentage of GDP. Zit represents the two control variables namely the
growth rate and the inﬂation rate. i and i are the individual ﬁxed effects for the panel member
i, while uit and vit are white noise errors.
It is, of course, well-known that a stationary time series X is said to Granger cause another
stationary series Y if the forecast of Y improves when lagged variables of X is taken into
account. If the lags of X are found to be jointly statistically signiﬁcant, then the null hypothesis
that X does not Granger cause Y can be rejected. In the context of the present paper, this
means that the variable FOit is said not to Granger cause CFit if all the coefﬁcients of lagged
FOit in Equation (2) are jointly not statistically different from zero. Although the main focus
of the paper is to test speciﬁcally whether causality runs from ﬁnancial liberalization to CF,
we consider the reverse case speciﬁed in Equation (3) as well. This is done as an additional
robustness check, and also because it is common in the literature to test causation in both
directions.
It should be noted that certain econometric problems may arise while using the OLS method
for estimating Equation (2) and (3). First, omitting individual effects can yield biased and
inconsistentestimates. Althoughindividual effectscanberemovedbytakingthe ﬁrstdifference
of all variables, there still remains correlation between the lagged dependent variables and the
error term. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), offers a solution to this problem by ﬁrst differencing equations (2) and (3) and
then using the appropriate lags of the dependent and the independent variables as instruments.
Apotentialproblemwiththistechnique, ontheotherhand, isthatthelaggedlevelsofregressors
may be weak instruments for the differenced variables. This in turn can be avoided by using
the “system GMM” estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
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(1998)5. To compute the system estimator, variables in differences are instrumented with the
lags of their own levels, while variables in levels are instrumented with the lags of their own
differences (Bond et al. 2009). Consequently, in the empirical analysis, we employ the lagged
values of all the explanatory variables as instruments in levels for the ﬁrst difference equations
while using the lagged ﬁrst differences of the endogenous variables as instruments in the level
equation, for t = 2 and earlier. This approach allows the introduction of more instruments and
thereby improves efﬁciency (Roodman 2009).6
Reported in Table 1 are the GMM estimation results for the CF equation. The ﬁrst column
of the table shows the bivariate analysis while the second and the third columns introduce the
inﬂation rate and the GDP growth rate consecutively. Based on Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criterion, the lag length is determined as 2. As can be seen in the lower panel of the table, l = 2
is also supported by Wald tests with the H0 that coefﬁcients on the second lag of the variables
are jointly zero. Because the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the soundness
of the instruments, two sets of diagnostic tests are also reported for the three models. First,
tests of ﬁrst order auto correlation (AR1) and second order auto correlation (AR2) show that
the disturbances at levels are uncorrelated. Second, the Sargan test statistic indicates that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and their validity is therefore not rejected at
the  = 0:05 level. The p-values for these tests are reported in the table as well.
Table 1 reveals that the coefﬁcients of the lagged ﬁnancial liberalization, our main variable
of interest, are not signiﬁcant in all three models. The Wald tests also do not reject the null of
no-causality at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. This main ﬁnding provides empirical support
for Schneider (2003) and Epstein (2005), who argue that CF continued to remain high after the
1990s despite ﬁnancial liberalization policies. The estimated coefﬁcients on the other variables
are interesting as well. In all regressions, lagged CF is found statistically signiﬁcant. This is
consistent with Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), who ﬁnd that countries with high levels of CF
5For the system GMM estimations, we use the xtabond2 command (Roodman 2009) run in Stata.
6Standard ADF and KPSS tests as well as panel unit root tests by Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) reveal
no nonstationarity in the differenced series. These results are not reported for brevity.
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Table 1: GMM Estimates and Causality Tests for CF
Dependent Variable: Capital Flight
(1) (2) (3)
CFit 1 0:3009 0:3007 0:2889
(0.0519) (0.0552) (0.0527)
CFit 2 0:1485 0:1416 0:1464
(0.0506) (0.0546) (0.0509)
FOit 1 0:4546 0:4352  0:2132
(0.4202) (0.4222) (0.5059)










Constant 0:7092 0:3765  0:0636
(0.2398) (0.5581) (0.6754)
n 456 456 456
Wald (l 6= 2 test) 0.01 0.01 0.01
AR1 test 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 test 0.84 0.83 0.87
Sargan test 0.43 0.37 0.42
Wald (noncausality test) 0.41 0.41 0.20
Note: Standard errors in parantheses. (***), (**) indicate signiﬁcance
at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively.
in the past are likely to continue experiencing this problem in the future due to the fact that CF
can be “habit forming,” making investors unlikely to respond rapidly to improvements in the
investmentclimate. ThestatisticallyinsigniﬁcantimpactofinﬂationonCFisobservedbyCerra
et al. (2008), and can be due to the reverse mechanism that, as CF erodes tax base, governments
can resort to money creation to ﬁnance ﬁscal deﬁcit (Ndikumana and Boyce 2003). Finally,
in the third column, the coefﬁcients for the GDP growth rate are found insigniﬁcant as well.
This result also supports Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), who argue that the insigniﬁcant GDP
coefﬁcients can be because economic growth is affected by some of the causes of CF, making
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it difﬁcult to isolate its independent effects.
As discussed earlier, ﬁnancial liberalization can have both positive and negative effects on
CF,whereasCFisnotexpectedtohaveadirectinﬂuenceonﬁnancialliberalization.7 Therefore,
we assume that the causal relation between ﬁnancial liberalization and CF runs in one direction.
On the other hand, because it is the usual practice in Granger-causality analyses to test for both
cases, we provide estimation results for the ﬁnancial openness equation as well. As can be seen
in Table 2, the apriori expectation of non causality is conﬁrmed by the high Wald statistic p-
values for our bivariate and multivariate speciﬁcations. Also as expected, short term changes in
the inﬂation rate and the growth rate do not have a signiﬁcant effect on ﬁnancial liberalization,
while ﬁnancial liberalization itself shows persistence due to its evolutionary nature. These
ﬁndings can be considered as additional evidence supporting our results.
4 Conclusion
Capital ﬂight, which measures the unrecorded accumulation of foreign assets by the private
sector, is one of the most important problems of capital-scarce developing economies. It has
adverse effects on growth, investment as well as the domestic tax base while also sending a
bad signal to foreign investors regarding the conﬁdence in the economy. Because of the ﬁ-
nancial liberalization efforts ongoing since the 1990s in many developing countries, examining
whether CF decreases with ﬁnancial liberalization is a meaningful research question that can
have important policy implications for emerging markets.
To investigate whether ﬁnancial liberalization can lead to lower CF, we employ Granger
causality tests for panel data using the dynamic panel estimation model of Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for 21 emerging market economies for the 1980-2004
period. Our results, which is robust to different speciﬁcations employed, do not show a causal
7A High level of CF could have acted in the past as an incentive to adopt ﬁnacial liberalization policies, at least
for some developing countries. The signiﬁcance of this impetus is not yet discussed in the literature and warrants
further research.
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Table 2: GMM Estimates and Causality Tests for FO
Dependent Variable: Financial Openness
(1) (2) (3)
CFit 1 0:0000  0:0005  0:0006
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
CFit 2  0:0067  0:0063  0:0061
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)
FOit 1 0:9423 0:9437 0:9472
(0.0471) (0.0473) (0.0478)










Constant 0:0107  0:0388 0:0259
(0.0267) (0.0625) (0.0663)
n 462 462 462
Wald (l 6= 2 test) 0.44 0.47 0.47
AR1 test 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 test 0.20 0.19 0.18
Sargan test 0.43 0.33 0.43
Wald (noncausality test) 0.42 0.47 0.47
Note: Standard errors in parantheses. (***), (**) indicate signiﬁcance
at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively.
relationship between ﬁnancial openness and CF. This supports earlier research by Schneider
(2003) and Epstein (2005), who calculate CF using different methodologies and ﬁnd that CF
has remained high after 1990 in many countries. Another important ﬁnding of our study is that
past CF has a signiﬁcant effect on its current level. This self-reinforcing behavior that has been
put forward by previus studies such as Ndikumana and Boyce (2003).
Our results show that ﬁnancial liberalization policies per se may not be a solution to the
CF problem. Evidently, required instead are the use of mechanisms and strategies that can be
more effective in preventing CF and encouraging capital repatriation. In this context, domestic
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authorities should give priority to the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies such
as decreasing the stock of debt, inﬂation, and budget deﬁcits as well as improving the domestic
investment environment. In addition, governments should give priority to the improvement
of general investment climate in order to attract private assets that are acquired legally and
held abroad for the purposes of return maximization (Fofack and Ndikumana 2010). Various
mechanisms for capital repatriation such as tax amnesties can also be considered. In Italy,
for example, a one year amnesty on privately held foreign assets in 2001 has resulted in the
repatriation of $30 billion from Swiss banks (Watts 2002). Last but not least, CF also includes
proceeds of illegal activities and preventing these activities may help alleviate the problem.
In this context, international community should be called for increased collaboration toward
introducing rules and regulations for the enforcement of transparency in the banking system
that would prevent the illicit transfer of capital across countries. Future research on this subject
should focus on the prospects of these strategies as well as extending the empirical analysis to
other developing countries. Country-speciﬁc investigations should be encouraged as well.
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